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The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law: Discouraging State Courts
From Recognizing Foreign-Country Money
Judgments in Absence of Debtor’s Assets
Debashish Bakshi*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2010, Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice in England
ruled that a Saudi Arabian conglomerate had defaulted on certain loans
borrowed from an Emirati commercial bank.1 To remedy this breach of
contract, the English court awarded the bank costs and damages that
ultimately exceeded forty million dollars.2 In August 2011, the bank
moved to “domesticate”3 the English judgment in New York  a state in
which the Saudi company did no business. Over the Saudi company’s
objections, a trial court recognized the English judgment and an appellate
panel affirmed the decision unanimously.4 At this point, civil procedure
enthusiasts should be scratching their heads: How could a judge in Lower
Manhattan have any power over a Middle Eastern entity that had no
meaningful connection to the Empire State?
To curtail overextension by state tribunals, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment limits a court’s exercise of power over

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 2010,
Stanford University. A special thank you to Professor William S. Dodge, who currently serves as CoReporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law:
Jurisdiction; this Note would not have been possible without his guidance, feedback, and eternal
patience. For their considerable effort and assistance, I also thank all staff at Hastings Business Law
Journal. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Mrinal Kanti Bakshi and Aparna Bakshi.
1. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting & Fin. Servs. Co., 986
N.Y.S.2d 454, 454 (App. Div. 2014).
2. Id.
3. Domestication (or “recognition”) is the process of “turn[ing] a judgment from a U.S. federal
court, a judgment from a court in another state, or a judgment from another country into an enforceable
[forum] state judgment.” MIKE ENGLEHART, PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN STATE, FEDERAL,
AND FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS, RENEWAL OF TEXAS JUDGMENTS, AND REVIVAL OF
DORMANT TEXAS JUDGMENTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RECENT CASE LAW 2 (2009), available at
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/procedure-for-enforcing-foreign-state-f-69507/.
4. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 457–58.
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nonresident defendants.5 To satisfy personal jurisdiction, defendants must
have sufficient contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state6 such that it
would be fair and reasonable to compel them to participate in and respond
to the action against them.7 Furthermore, in Shaffer v. Heitner,8 the
Supreme Court declared that the mere presence of a defendant’s property in
a given state is an insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the property
is unrelated to the underlying claim.9 Nevertheless, the Court suggested in
dicta that in a state where a defendant holds assets, a court may enforce a
valid out-of-state judgment regardless of the court’s jurisdiction as to the
original claim.10 The process of satisfying an out-of-state money judgment,
however, involves two distinct and independent steps: recognition and
enforcement.11 Furthermore, parties may seek recognition for purposes
other than enforcement in the recognizing jurisdiction.12 But the Court in
Shaffer did not address whether courts must have personal jurisdiction over
judgment debtors if creditors merely seek to domesticate a judgment
separately from an enforcement action.13
The Note proceeds in three parts. Part II begins by discussing state
mechanisms of recognition and enforcement. Part III then surveys state
court interpretations of Shaffer’s Footnote 36 and resolves the apparent
discrepancy in recent cases concerning the absence of assets. Finally, in
Part IV, this Note evaluates the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) tentative
language on this issue and explores why it is a necessary piece of reform in
U.S. foreign relations law. If a state court does not otherwise have personal
jurisdiction over a debtor, the court should decline to recognize foreigncountry money judgments in the absence of the debtor’s assets. Given the
complexity of the foreign-country judgment recognition process and its
subsequent effect on a debtor’s rights, a judgment debtor should not have to
appear and dispute recognition in any jurisdiction in which they have
neither property nor meaningful contacts.

5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
6. Id. at 294 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
7. Id. at 292 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
8. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
9. Id. at 209.
10. See id. at 210 n. 36. The Court reasoned that applying strict International Shoe requirements to
the enforcing jurisdiction would allow a judgment debtor to easily skirt their obligations by transferring
their assets to a state with which they had insufficient minimum contacts. See id. at 210.
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION & JUDGMENTS § 481
cmt. b (1987) (“Recognition and enforcement distinguished.”). Out-of-state judgments addressed in
this Note are limited to decisions where the remedy is money (hence “money judgments”) as opposed to
equitable relief. A successful claimant seeking to domesticate the out-of-state decision is therefore the
“judgment creditor” and accordingly the unsuccessful party is the “judgment debtor.”
12. Id.
13. See generally Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186.
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II. MECHANISMS OF RECOGNIZING OUT-OF-STATE
JUDGMENTS.
In addition to adjudicating domestic disputes, courts in the United
States may recognize and enforce out-of-state judgments. For example,
state courts routinely recognize money judgments rendered in other states14
(“sister-state” judgments) or nations15 (“foreign-country” judgments). As
discussed below, courts often conflate recognition with enforcement.
Furthermore, courts sometimes treat foreign-country judgments in the same
manner as sister-state decisions.
Unfortunately, courts’ failure to
distinguish these distinct and meaningful categories has led to unnecessary
discord, confusion, and unfairness.
A. THE INDEPENDENT PROCESSES OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Recognition is the domestication of an out-of-state judgment such that
it has the same effect as any local judgment.16 Enforcement, on the other
hand, is the satisfaction of a judgment debt.17 Although procedures and
collection mechanisms may vary from state to state, the process of
enforcement typically involves serving “information” subpoenas to locate
and identify property,18 liens to secure an interest in the property,19
restraining notices to “freeze” bank accounts,20 and writs of execution to
seize and transfer assets.21

14. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof.”). Common examples include “deadbeat parent” cases where state courts recognize out-ofstate divorce decrees. Once the divorce is domesticated, the out-of-state parent can take enforcement
actions to collect money to satisfy unpaid alimony and child support payments.
15. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481(1) (“[A] final judgment of a court of a foreign state
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or
determining interests in property, is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in
courts in the United States.”).
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. b (“Effect of foreign judgment.”).
17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. g (“Proceedings to enforce foreign judgments in
the United States.”).
18. See JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT § 3.01 (“The objective of postjudgment
discovery is to determine whether the debtor has assets or whether there may be methods for collecting
assets from third parties as a result of their relationship with the debtor.”).
19. See id. at § 12.07 (“The judgment creditor may place a lien on the judgment debtor’s real or
personal property in order to secure the judgment.”).
20. See id. at § 15.05 (“Most commonly, restraining notices are served upon local banking
branches or financial institutions in an effort to restrain the funds in the bank account, so that the funds
can be executed upon.”).
21. See id. (“[A]ll property that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment is subject to levy
under a writ of execution to satisfy a money judgment.”).
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Judgment creditors primarily seek recognition to enforce a money
judgment where the judgment debtors’ assets are beyond the reach of the
court rendering the original judgment. Specifically, a creditor will seek
recognition to satisfy a debt where the assets are present in the recognizing
state. Alternatively, a creditor can pursue domestication in a given state
and then leverage the newly recognized judgment to seek enforcement in
yet another state22 or country.23 Enforcement, however, is not the only
reason to seek recognition.24 Either party, for example, may seek
recognition for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes to preclude
relitigation of claims and issues resolved in the original out-of-state
judgment.25
B. STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS FOR RECOGNITION AND CORRESPONDING
SCRUTINY OF COURTS RENDERING ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
Although courts may recognize both sister-state and foreign-country
judgments, states apply more rigorous procedures to the latter. The
respective mechanisms of domestication reflect the fundamental
differences between the two types of out-of-state judgments.
1. Sister-State Judgments
Courts afford sister-state judgments considerable deference on
constitutional, practical, and cultural grounds. First, and most importantly,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to respect the “judicial
proceedings of every other state.”26 Second, given the ease of mobility
within the United States, skeptical treatment of sister-state judgments

22. See ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 29 (2007) (“If circumstances in the state where you are ultimately
seeking conversion do not favor recognition, an alternative strategy . . . is to seek a judgment in another
state under that state’s foreign country judgments recognition procedures, and then establish the
recognized judgment in your state as a sister-state judgment.”). State courts, however, are split on
whether foreign judgments recognized by other states are entitled to full faith and credit. Compare
Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2014)
(affording full faith and credit to Bahraini judgment domesticated in New York) with Ahmad Hamad Al
Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 13-CV-1415, 2014 WL 4356135 (D.C. Ct. App.
Sept. 4, 2014) (declining to afford full faith and credit to the same domesticated judgment). The ALI’s
tentative draft Restatement takes the position that U.S. judgments recognizing foreign judgments are not
entitled to full faith and credit. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 401 cmt g.
23. See, e.g., Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd., 260 Mich. App. 144, 148 (2003)
(seeking recognition of Liberian judgment in Michigan to ultimately enforce against defendant’s assets
in England).
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. b (“Effect of foreign judgment.”).
25. See id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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would frustrate the enforcement of judgments.27 Third, state courts are
generally rooted in the same legal customs and traditions and thus a judge
is less likely to second-guess the propriety of a sister-state judgment.
Nearly all U.S. states and territories have adopted a straightforward
administrative process to domesticate sister-state judgments without having
to bring a new common law action.28 The Enforcement Act enables
recognition by simply having the party seeking enforcement of the
judgment file the judgment with the court29 and provide notice to the
judgment debtor.30 Under the Enforcement Act, a debtor may request a
stay in recognition proceedings upon a showing of appeal.31 A debtor may
also challenge the personal jurisdiction of the court rendering the original
judgment, but may not relitigate the underlying claim. In the sister-state
context, however, the burden is on the debtor to raise and demonstrate lack
of personal jurisdiction.32 In other words, the original court’s power over
the judgment debtor is a rebuttable presumption. In sum, courts seem to
recognize sister-state judgments without much scrutiny.
2. Foreign Country Judgments
Unlike sister-state judgments, state courts examine foreign-country
judgments more closely. This is due in part to the fact that state judges are
less familiar with legal systems outside of the United States and that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to other states in the union, not other
countries. In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court identified several
grounds for declining to recognize foreign judgments, including the foreign
court’s lack of jurisdiction, inadequate process, and fraud.33 Following
Hilton, most state courts recognized and enforced foreign country

27. C.f. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT eds. notes (1948) (revised 1964) (“The
mobility, today, of both persons and property is such that existing procedure for the enforcement of
judgments in those cases where the judgment debtor has removed himself and his property from the
state in which the judgment was rendered, is inadequate.”).
28. See generally REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (1964)
(“Enforcement Act”). Although the Enforcement Act discusses the “enforcement” of “foreign
judgments,” the statute in fact speaks to the recognition of sister-state judgments rather than the
satisfaction of foreign-country judgments. See id.
29. See id. at § 2.
30. See id. at § 3.
31. See id. at § 4.
32. See Law Firm of Paul L. Erickson, P.A. v. Boykin, 681 S.E.2d 575, 579 (S.C. 2009) (holding
South Carolina Enforcement Act provision unconstitutional for placing burden on creditor).
33. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see also Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff,
Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective,
29 PEPP. L. REV. 147, 150 (2001) (noting how courts in common law jurisdictions have followed Hilton
criteria except for the Court’s “reciprocity” requirement).
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judgments based on the common law principle of the “comity of nations.”34
A clear majority of states, however, have now standardized the process of
recognition (and grounds for nonrecognition) by adopting one of two
uniform acts that codified the common law of recognizing foreign-country
judgments.35
The Recognition Act allows a state court to recognize foreign
judgments once they are final and conclusive.36 Furthermore, the
Recognition Act forbids recognition where the foreign country’s judiciary
system does not provide impartial tribunals.37 The Recognition Act also
prohibits state courts from recognizing foreign debt judgments where the
foreign court lacked personal38 or subject-matter jurisdiction.39 The
Recognition Act then provides several grounds for the court to refuse
recognition at the court’s discretion.40 In contrast to Enforcement Act
plaintiffs, judgment creditors under the Recognition Act have the burden of
demonstrating the foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition.41
This includes demonstrating that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction
over the debtor.42 In testing the personal jurisdiction of the original court,
U.S. courts have generally applied International Shoe standards rather than
the foreign judiciary’s own procedural requirements.43 Given the purposes
and criteria of the Recognition Act, state courts do not (or rather should
not) treat the recognition of foreign country judgments as readily  and
with as little scrutiny  as they do for sister-state judgments under the
Enforcement Act.

34. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113; Comity of nations “is the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.” Id. at 164.
35. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005) [herinafter
“Recognition Act”].
36. Id. at § 2 (“Applicability).
37. Id. at § 4(a)(1).
38. Id. at § 4(a)(2).
39. Id. at § 4(a)(3).
40. Id. at § 4(b). These grounds include circumstances where the debtor did not receive adequate
notice of the foreign court proceedings, the judgment was obtained by fraud, the underlying claim is
repugnant to state public policy, the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment, the
foreign court proceedings were contrary to an agreement between parties, or the foreign court was a
“seriously inconvenient forum.” Id.
41. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 457–58 (“[T]he legislature reasonably
placed the burden on the proponent of a foreign judgment of showing that the foreign court was
impartial and followed basic principles of due process.”).
42. See Recognition Act §§ 4(a)(2), 5.
43. See, e.g., de la Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1383–84 (D. Del. 1991) aff’d,
961 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1992); Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir. 1981).
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III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS RECOGNIZING
JUDGMENT
Shaffer v. Heitner foreclosed the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
in cases where the defendant’s in-state property was unrelated to the out-ofstate claim.44 The Shaffer Court, however, suggested in Footnote 36 that a
state court need not have jurisdiction over a judgment debtor when
enforcing a sister-state money judgment against the debtor’s assets:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff,
there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action
to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has
property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to
determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.45
The Court explained that a debtor should not be able to “avoid paying
his obligations by removing his property to a state in which his creditor
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him.”46 The Court further noted
that “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . makes the valid in personam
judgment of one State enforceable in all other States.”47
Shaffer’s Footnote 36 was the Supreme Court’s last word on whether
courts recognizing or enforcing out-of-state money judgments require
personal jurisdiction over debtors.48 Furthermore, state-based Recognition
Acts are silent on this issue.49 Finally, Congress has not passed any statutes
that could address the question by federalizing the recognition process. As
a result, state court opinions best indicate the state of the law and its
trajectory.50
Over the past thirty-nine years since Shaffer, state courts across the
country have cited to and interpreted Footnote 36 to determine personal
jurisdiction requirements over non-resident judgment debtors. Indeed,
courts have discussed Footnote 36 in recognition and enforcement
44. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209.
45. Shaffer, 433. U.S. at 210, n.36 (“Footnote 36”).
46. See id. at 210.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 458–59 (referring to Shaffer alone for
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court).
49. See generally supra note 35.
50. Federal courts sometimes recognize and enforce foreign country judgments, but typically when
sitting in diversity and thus applying state domestication laws. Despite calls to nationalize the treatment
of foreign country judgments, no federal laws preempt state recognition and enforcement procedures.
On the other hand, district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to evaluate and domesticate international
arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 290k-11(2) (West).

288

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:2

proceedings concerning both sister-state and foreign-country judgments.
A. FOOTNOTE 36 IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Consistent with Footnote 36, courts agree that they need not have
personal jurisdiction over debtors to enforce judgments against out-of-state
judgment debtors.51 The debtor, however, must still possess property instate to satisfy Due Process. In the few cases where the presence of the
debtor’s domestic assets were contested, courts have understandably
disfavored enforcement where the creditor has failed to identify said
assets.52 Courts have held this position in cases involving not only sisterstate decisions, but also foreign country judgments.53 Moreover, no court
has held that a creditor may initiate enforcement proceedings in the absence
of property. Intuitively, permitting enforcement would be impractical,
unfair, and illogical where there is simply no debtor property to identify,
seize, and transfer. The consensus with respect to enforcement, however,
stands in contrast to the apparent discord among state courts regarding the
need for personal jurisdiction in recognition proceedings.
B. FOOTNOTE 36 IN RECOGNITION PROCEEDINGS
Given that most creditors seek recognition to quickly enforce against
debtor’s identifiable assets in the same jurisdiction, few Footnote 36 cases
have specifically addressed recognition independently of enforcement.54
Furthermore, only New York,55 Texas,56 and Michigan57 courts have
51. See, e.g., Arbor Farms, LLC v. GeoStar Corp., 314911, 2014 WL 2197846, at *3–5 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 27, 2014); Koh v. Inno-Pac. Holdings, Ltd., 54 P.3d 1270, 1272–73 (Wash. App. 2002);
Kingsland Holding, Inc. v. Bracco, No. CIV. A. 14817, 1996 WL 104257 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1996);
UMS Partners, Ltd. v. Jackson, 94J-12-159H-17-076, 1995 WL 413395 (Del. Sup. Ct. June 15, 1995);
Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gwinnett Prop., N.V. v. GH Montage
GmbH, 215 Ga. App. 889, 895 (1994); Sagona v. Doty, 25 Va. Cir. 529 (1991); First v. State, Dep’t of
Soc. & Rehab. Servs. ex rel. LaRoche, 247 Mont. 465, 474–75 (1991); Ruiz v. Lloses, 559 A.2d 866,
867–68 (N.J. App. Div. 1989); Fraser v. Littlejohn, 96 N.C. App. 377, 379–81 (1989); see also Joseph
E. Neuhaus, Current Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 36 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 29 (2004) (collecting cases to support proposition that “[a]fter Shaffer, state
courts throughout the country have regularly applied ‘quasi in rem’ jurisdiction in cases seeking to
enforce foreign-state judgments, without imposing any requirement that the property be related to the
subject matter of the dispute”).
52. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 275 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1981) (federal courts have also applied
this rationale when declining to enforce international arbitral awards). See, e.g., Glencore Grain
Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2002); accord
Cargnani v. Pewag Austria G.m.b.H., No. CIV. S-05-0133 WBSJF, 2007 WL 415992 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5,
2007).
53. See generally supra note 52.
54. See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
55. Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 47–50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
56. Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., 260 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex. App. 2008).
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addressed their own personal jurisdiction in the context of recognizing
foreign-country judgments. New York and Texas have taken the position
that in-state assets are not required for pure recognition purposes. On the
other hand, the ALI’s draft Restatement (Fourth) on Foreign Relations Law
interprets Michigan’s position in Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance
Co. as requiring such assets for recognition, and is therefore in conflict
with New York’s decision in Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric and its progeny.
Upon closer review, however, the court’s holding in Electrolines concerned
enforcement rather than recognition alone and thus does not stand for
anything more than the uncontroversial position that in-state assets are a
prerequisite to enforcement.
1. Lenchyshyn and Abu Dhabi.
New York courts have held that personal jurisdiction over a debtor is
not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment.58 In Lenchyshyn —
the first case in the United States addressing this issue — Michael
Lenchyshyn sought both recognition and enforcement of a Canadian money
judgment resulting from his intellectual property claims against Pelko
Electric, Inc.59 Upon service of process, Pelko unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that the company had no
presence or business in New York.60 Lenchyshyn, on the other hand,
argued Pelko had a “jurisdictional nexus” with New York based on
allegations of hidden funds and significant commercial activity.61
Affirming on appeal, the Lenchyshyn court held that neither the U.S.
Constitution nor New York law required a “jurisdictional basis” for
recognizing foreign-country judgments.62 First, the court determined that
while New York’s version of the Recognition Act had several enumerated
bases for non-recognition, the personal jurisdiction of the New York court
recognizing the judgment is not one of them and its absence was a “telling
omission.”63 Second, citing Footnote 36, the court concluded that personal
jurisdiction was not required by the Due Process clause for recognition
purposes.64 Third, the court did not believe the procedural differences
between the Recognition and Enforcement Acts implied “additional
jurisdictional requirements to be satisfied in proceedings to obtain
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 883–85 (Mich. App. 2003).
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 454; Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 47–50.
Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 47–48.
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recognition.”65 While acknowledging the formality and complexity of
domesticating foreign-country judgments, the court decided that
Recognition Act requirements “should not be viewed as allowing the
judgment debtor to raise nonstatutory obstacles to recognition of the
foreign-country money judgment.”66
Fourth, characterizing the recognition process as a “ministerial
function,” the court surmised that imposing additional personal jurisdiction
requirements would be unfair and impractical for creditors because “[m]ost
devices for the enforcement of money judgments operate in rem against the
real or personal property of the judgment debtor, or in personam against
third parties, such as banks, investment firms, employers, or other thirdparty garnishees, obligors or debtors of the judgment debtor.”67 Fifth, the
court deemed Lenchyshyn had sufficiently alleged Pelko’s New York
assets and that “[s]uch assets and/or debts would have a New York situs,
which is all that is required to subject them to levy or restraint here as a
means of enforcing the domesticated Ontario judgment.”68 Finally, the
Lenchyshyn court opined that even in the absence of assets, courts should
recognize judgments to allow creditors to enforce against later-acquired
property;
[m]oreover, even if defendants do not presently have assets
in New York, plaintiffs nevertheless should be granted
recognition of the foreign country money judgment pursuant
to CPLR article 53, and thereby should have the opportunity
to pursue all such enforcement steps in futuro, whenever it
might appear that defendants are maintaining assets in New
York, including at any time during the initial life of the
domesticated Ontario money judgment or any subsequent
renewal period.69
Lenchyshyn therefore required domestic assets for enforcement of
foreign-country judgments, but opened the door to the possibility of
recognition in absence of such assets.
In 2014, a New York court applied Lenchyshyn to affirm recognition
of a forty-million dollar English judgment, despite debtor’s lack of in-state
property.70 As in Lenchyshyn, the court in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 49.
Id.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 454–55.
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PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contr. & Fin. Servs. Co expressly rejected debtor’s
contention that the stricter requirements of foreign-country recognition
implied jurisdictional requirements beyond those specified in the
Recognition Act.71 The court further stated that because “[New York’s
rules of civil procedure] and the English court are already protecting the
defendant’s due process rights, including personal jurisdiction, the court
charged with recognition and enforcement should not be required to grant
further protection during a ministerial enforcement action.”72 Lastly, in a
reference to Footnote 36, the Abu Dhabi court believed “[t]here is no
unfairness to the defendant if the plaintiff obtains an order in New York
recognizing the foreign judgment, which can then be enforced if the
defendant is found to have, or later brings, property into the State.”73 New
York has therefore established itself as a permissive arena for judgment
creditors strategically seeking recognition without the prospect of
immediate enforcement.74
2. The Electrolines-Haaksman “Disagreement”
Declining to follow Abu Dhabi, Michigan courts require jurisdiction
over debtors or their property to domesticate foreign country judgments.75
In Electrolines, Electrolines, Inc. sought recognition of a Liberian
judgment against several European insurance companies, with the ulterior
motive of ultimately seizing defendants’ assets in the United Kingdom.76
Among other reasons, the trial court found in summary disposition that the
court’s personal jurisdiction over the insurance companies was irrelevant to
Recognition Act proceedings.77
Reversing on appeal, the Electrolines court held creditors must
demonstrate personal jurisdiction because the entry of judgment is
governed by the Enforcement Act and therefore constitutes an enforcement
action.78 Furthermore, by examining the language of the creditor’s
complaint and other filings, the court believed Electrolines sought not just
71. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
72. Id. at 458.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. C.f. CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d 215, 221 (2003) (“New
York has traditionally been a generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages
rendered by foreign courts”). New York becomes an even more attractive venue for judgment creditors
when considering that a New York court may compel a bank within their jurisdiction to deliver the
judgment debtor’s out-of-state assets. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 536 (2009).
75. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 880.
76. Id. at 877–78. This lawsuit arose from an insurance claim filed by Electrolines, Inc., for
property damage resulting from a fire at its store and factory in Monrovia, Liberia. See id.
77. Id. at 877.
78. Id. at 882.
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recognition, but also enforcement.79 The Electrolines court also reasoned
that in “establish[ing] that personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to its
recognition and enforcement action,” the “holding of Lenchyshyn is helpful
only where a party demonstrates that property of the judgment debtor is
located within the jurisdiction of the court.”80 The court also stated:
However, plaintiff overlooks that the judgment debtors in
Lenchyshyn had assets in the enforcing state, to wit, bank
accounts in Buffalo, New York, and a New York corporation
where one of the defendants was a principal. Although the
Lenchyshyn court concluded that personal jurisdiction was
not required, the Lenchyshyn court acquired jurisdiction
because the defendants had property in New York. Indeed,
the Lenchyshyn court concluded that “[a]t bottom,
defendants take the illogical and inequitable position that a
judgment debtor’s New York assets should be immune from
execution or restraint so long as the judgment debtor absents
himself from New York . . . .” Thus, the holding of
Lenchyshyn is helpful only where a party demonstrates that
property of the judgment debtor is located within the
jurisdiction of the court.81
Holding that the creditor had failed to demonstrate the Michigan trial
court’s personal jurisdiction over the debtors, Electrolines reversed the
lower court’s order.82
Texas courts, on the other hand, have followed Lenchyshyn to
recognize foreign-country money judgments despite the absence of debtor
assets.83 In Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., creditors
sought recognition of a Dutch judgment against their former employer,
Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. (“Diamond Bermuda”).84 In response,
Diamond Bermuda contested the trial court’s personal jurisdiction by filing
for a special appearance and moving for nonrecognition.85 Although
creditors asserted Diamond Bermuda was subject to general jurisdiction
due to their contacts with the state, the trial court nevertheless granted
special appearance.86 Reversing on appeal, the Haaksman court rejected
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 883–84.
Id. at 885.
Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 877.
Id. at 889.
Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
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Diamond Bermuda’s contention that the trial court “lacked a valid basis for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellee, [and] therefore, the
foreign judgment should not be recognized in Texas.”87
While
acknowledging that Texas’ Recognition Act permitted challenges to the
personal jurisdiction of the foreign court, the Haaksman court noted the
Recognition Act did not require the recognizing court to have such
jurisdiction over the debtor.88 In their appeal, Diamond Bermuda relied on
Electrolines to support their proposition that a court considering
recognition must determine personal jurisdiction if the debtor has no instate property.89
Rejecting this argument, the Haaksman court pointed out that
Lenchyshyn permitted recognition in the absence of debtor assets to “have
the opportunity to pursue all such enforcement steps in [the] future.”90 The
Haaksman court concluded that “even if a judgment debtor does not
currently have property in Texas, a judgment creditor should be allowed
the opportunity to obtain recognition of his foreign-money judgment and
later pursue enforcement if or when the judgment debtor appears to be
maintaining assets in Texas.”91
Haaksman was right to note that Electrolines ignored Lenchyshyn’s
language regarding recognition in the absence of assets. Electrolines,
however, was correct as a matter of law in requiring personal jurisdiction;
the Michigan court’s error was in misinterpreting the creditor’s pleadings
as a demand for both recognition and enforcement of the Liberian
judgment. In line with the consensus position discussed above, the court
then ruled against Electrolines because enforcement requires presence of
assets. As a result, the court’s mistake was not in their statement of law
concerning enforcement, but rather in their strained interpretation of the
relief sought. Given their express desire to leverage the anticipated
Michigan judgment to pursue debtor’s assets in England, creditors were not
seeking ultimate enforcement in Michigan.92 Furthermore, even if the
creditor sought enforcement in Michigan post-recognition, Electrolines
could not proceed if they failed to identify the debtor’s in-state assets for
seizure.93 Finally, remembering that the Enforcement Act is a mechanism
to recognize sister-state judgments, the Electrolines court assumed actions
falling under the Enforcement Act necessarily constitute enforcement

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 479.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 878.
Id.
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proceedings.94 On the contrary, as noted in the court’s opinion, judgments
filed under Michigan’s Enforcement Act are recognized, but not yet
enforced because they have “the same effect and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying
as a judgment of the circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of
this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”95 By failing to
distinguish recognition and enforcement proceedings, and their respective
functions and requirements, the Electrolines court erred by adamantly
characterizing the creditor’s action for recognition as the pursuit of
enforcement.
Despite the court’s mischaracterization of the creditor’s pleadings and
misconstruction of the Enforcement Act, Electrolines does not conflict with
Lenchyshyn or its progeny. As a matter of law, Electrolines is limited to
the consensus position that in-state assets are a necessary prerequisite to
enforcement, not recognition alone. In fact, at the outset of their analysis,
the Electrolines court stated “[t]he facts of this case do not require us to
decide the jurisdictional requirements of a complaint brought solely under
the [Recognition Act].”96 As a result, Lenchyshyn remains unchallenged by
state courts outside of New York: To recognize foreign-country money
judgments, courts need not have jurisdiction over debtors or their property.
Due process concerns, however, militate against this position.
IV. IS RECOGNITION FAIR IN JURISDICTIONS ALIEN TO
DEBTORS?
Taken together, Footnote 36 and Lenchyshyn are appealing
propositions for international judgment creditors. The ALI, however,
asserts that the Lenchyshyn court and its adherents have misread Footnote
36 in dispensing with the personal jurisdiction requirement.97
The ALI–a national organization of distinguished legal professionals
 guides judges and practitioners by publishing scholarly work that
organizes black letter law, addresses uncertainties, and recommends areas
of reform.98 One of the ALI’s projects, the Restatement of The Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, was last revised in 1987 and the ALI is
now in the process of updating it for the fourth edition.99 On May 19,
94. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 883.
95. Id. (emphasis added)
96. Id.
97. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION & JUDGMENTS § 402
Reporter’s Note 3. (2014) (Tentative Draft No. 1).
98. About ALI, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:55 PM), https://www.ali.org/about-ali/.
99. The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016,
6:57 PM), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/foreign-relations-law-united-states/.
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2014, ALI’s membership approved a tentative draft of sections concerning
jurisdiction,100 which states that “[a] person seeking recognition of a
foreign judgment through a civil proceeding must obtain jurisdiction over
any person against whom the judgment will operate” such that “the persons
whom the judgment will bind have sufficient contacts with the forum to
satisfy due process.”101 In “[p]roceeding[s] to enforce foreign judgments,
however, the presence of assets belonging to any person against whom
enforcement is sought will satisfy due process.”102
But under Lenchysyn, creditors may seek recognition for any reason,
and three broad purposes come to mind: to “lie in wait” for future assets, to
seek enforcement in yet another state or country, and to preclude
relitigation of settled issues or claims. To understand why the Lenchyshyn
standard violates a judgment debtor’s due process rights, we must examine
all three of these recognition scenarios as they each present a different
balance of interests between parties.
A. RECOGNITION IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE ASSETS
For judgment creditors, one benefit of the Lenchyshyn rule is that noncompliant debtors are essentially “locked out” of the jurisdiction until they
satisfy their judgment debt.103 But even if we accepted these effects as
desirable, Lenchyshyn still underestimates the burden of disputing the
recognition of foreign-country judgments, particularly when compared to
the domestication of sister-state decisions. In other words, Lenchysyn is
insensitive to the “burden that the judgment debtor would suffer had she to
defend herself in various enforcing fora, even where she has no tie
whatsoever with the jurisdiction.”104 To satisfy due process, courts and
practitioners should consider the Restatement’s position: “A person seeking
recognition of a foreign judgment through a civil proceeding must obtain
jurisdiction over any person against whom the judgment will operate.”105
A debtor with several statutory grounds to dispute recognition should
not have the burden to appear in any state of the creditor’s choosing.106 To
100. Actions Taken at the 91st Annual Meeting, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:59
PM), http://2014annualmeeting.org/actions-taken/.
101. Supra note 98, § 402 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1).
102. Id.
103. See Emilio Bettoni, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments Despite the
Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 174–75 (2013) (“A favorable decision rendered in any
jurisdiction, coupled with the opportunity to recognize a foreign judgment elsewhere regardless of the
presence of assets would grant to the prevailing company a comparative advantage were it to decide to
invest in a country where none of the parties is present.”).
104. Id. at 184 (dismissing this concern).
105. Supra note 98, at § 402 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1).
106. See Linda J. Silberman and Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
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illustrate this in a hypothetical scenario, consider a small Japanese
business, Arigato, LLC (“Arigato”), that is sued by one of their
competitors, a larger Chinese company, Nihao Corporation (“Nihao”).
Upon securing a sizeable money judgment in proceedings in a court in
China, Nihao seeks recognition in New York. Arigato currently has no
dealings with, or assets in, the United States, let alone the Empire State.
Moreover, Arigato considers the foreign court proceedings as unfair and
believes the Chinese tribunal was not impartial.
Under Lenchyshyn, despite Arigato’s lack of ties to the state, the New
York court initiates recognition proceedings. Although given notice,
Arigato is caught off-guard because it has no connection to the state and
thus had no expectation of being “haled into court” to dispute recognition
in that jurisdiction. Arigato, however, will feel obligated to retain local
counsel, dispatch representatives, and generally expend resources due to
the risk of recognition, which would prevent Arigato from ever doing
business or holding assets in New York. This example demonstrates how,
by disposing of personal jurisdiction altogether, the Lenchyshyn standard
can be unfair for debtors in foreign-country judgments and violate their
Due Process rights.
This scenario stands in stark contrast to the sister-state context. While
the Recognition Act requires separate proceedings and an examination of
several bases for mandatory and discretionary nonrecognition, the
Enforcement Act is little more than a formality, with the presumption that
sister-state judgments are constitutionally entitled to recognition. As a
result, courts have concluded that personal jurisdiction is not required to
recognize a sister-state judgment.107 In Gingold v. Gingold, for example,
the plaintiff sought recognition of a New York divorce decree in California
against her ex-husband.108 Holding that it was “not necessary for a
California court to have jurisdiction over the person or property of an
obligor in order to validly register a foreign support order,” the California
Court of Appeal characterized the recognition process as a “ministerial
duty of the clerk” which “does not prejudice any rights of the obligor.”109
As discussed, debtors may collaterally attack the judgment but they have
very limited grounds to dispute its presumed legitimacy. The process of
recognizing a sister-state judgment thus does not require full-fledged

Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609 (forthcoming 2016)
(“A judgment debtor has a number of defenses available to challenge the original judgment, but a
judgment debtor should not be forced to raise those defenses in any forum that the judgment-creditor
might choose to bring an enforcement action.”).
107. Gingold v. Gingold, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 1182–84 (1984).
108. Id. at 1180.
109. Id. at 1184.
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personal jurisdiction to satisfy a debtor’s due process rights.
B. RECOGNITION FOR OUT-OF-STATE ENFORCEMENT
In the hypothetical above, Arigato’s dilemma is worsened by the
possibility that Nihao would take the newly recognized New York
judgment and seek enforcement in another state or country.110 But to what
end? Nihao could benefit in one of two ways by “converting” the judgment
in one jurisdiction with the ultimate aim of enforcement elsewhere.
First, even if the sister-state had a higher standard for domesticating
foreign judgments, the sister-state is much more likely to respect and
recognize the New York judgment. An appellate court in Pennsylvania
took this very position in Standard Chartered Bank111 when affirming a
lower court’s decision to recognize a Bahraini judgment domesticated in
New York. The court stated that:
[p]ursuant to the U.S. Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit
Act, and the Enforcement Act, Standard Chartered’s New
York judgment is, as a matter of law, entitled to full faith
and credit in Pennsylvania as with any other judgment issued
by a New York court. That the New York judgment
recognized a foreign nation judgment is of no moment. Just
as Pennsylvania courts were compelled to recognize [sisterstate judgments from New Jersey and West Virginia]
pursuant to full faith and credit, we are similarly bound to
recognize the instant New York judgment. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in giving full faith and credit to the
New York judgment and denying AHAB’s plea to disregard
full faith and credit and vacate the Pennsylvania judgment.112
Second, a foreign country’s court may be more receptive to
recognizing an American judgment than a Chinese one. Indeed, the
creditors in Electrolines sought recognition in Michigan for that reason;
they believed an English court would more readily domesticate an
Americanized judgment compared to the original Liberian ruling. In these
situations, creditors can forum shop among the States for courts amenable
to recognition and “transfer” the judgment to out-of-state jurisdictions
110. See generally Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and
the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 478
(2013) (labelling this type of forum shopping as “judgment arbitrage”).
111. Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 396.
112. Id. at *943–44 (citations omitted).
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where the creditor’s assets are actually located. As a result, a judgment
creditor’s ability to seek recognition for the purposes of out-of-state
enforcement exacerbates the unfairness in Lenchyshyn.113
On this point, the ALI’s position in the Restatement (Fourth) is that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not “require a U.S. Court
automatically to regard as conclusive the decision of another U.S. court to
recognize, or not to recognize, a foreign judgment.”114 One rationale for
this position is that “denying automatic enforcement of a sister-State’s
recognition of a foreign judgment would discourage forum shopping that
could ensue from bifurcation of the recognition and enforcement States.”115
Although the ALI’s stance is reasonable and mitigates the unfairness
described above, its position is insufficient as trial courts are still more
likely to honor foreign judgments domesticated by sister-states even if
courts are not obligated to do so under the U.S. Constitution. If additional
state courts join New York and Texas in casually dispensing with the
personal jurisdiction requirement with respect to recognition proceedings,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court may need to clarify Footnote 36 to
ensure that state courts are not depriving judgment debtors of their liberty
or property without the due process of law.
C. RECOGNITION FOR THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Finally, parties may seek recognition in absence of assets for res
judicata or collateral estoppel purposes, rather than for a foreign-money
enforcement.116 For example, a debtor may defensively seek recognition to
prevent a creditor’s relitigation of a claim or issue settled earlier overseas
in the debtor’s favor.117 Alternatively, a creditor may offensively seek
recognition in the U.S. to bar relitigation of particular issues of fact or law.
These scenarios, however, would not violate the debtor’s Due Process
rights. In either case, courts have power over the party because the creditor
or debtor seeking recognition is appearing in the state by choice, and thus
voluntarily submitting themselves to the recognizing court’s jurisdiction.
As a result, no parties consenting to a court’s authority suffer from Due

113. See Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 43.
114. Supra note 98, at § 401 cmt. g (emphasis added); see also Standard Chartered Bank, 98 A.3d
at 1004 (The Supreme Court has made clear that “the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable
and unqualified command.” (quoting Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Exp., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941)).
115. Id.
116. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.W.L.) v. Bezdikian, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 243 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 481, cm. b, p. 595; Renoir v. Redstar Corp., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603
(2004)) (recognizing that a party may rely on res judicata or collateral estoppel principles unrelated to
enforcement of a money judgment).
117. See generally supra, note 117 and accompanying text.
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Process violations because the question of personal jurisdiction in foreign
money-judgment recognition proceedings does not turn on such preclusion
scenarios.
IV. CONCLUSION
Claimants who have won their case deserve to be made whole.
International judgment creditors should thus have every opportunity to
seize debtor assets wherever located. As the Supreme Court noted in
Shaffer, no debtor should be able to “avoid paying his obligations by
removing his property to a state in which his creditor cannot obtain
personal jurisdiction over him.”118
But if state courts do not otherwise have personal jurisdiction over a
debtor, the court should not recognize foreign-country money judgments in
the absence of the debtor’s assets in that forum. Considering the
complications inherent to the foreign-country judgment recognition process
and the potential impact on rights and liabilities, it is fundamentally unfair
to require a judgment debtor to appear and dispute recognition in any
jurisdiction in which they have no property and no meaningful contacts.119
To that end, state court systems and practitioners of international
litigation alike should resist the urge to treat the recognition of foreigncountry money judgments as a mere formality and instead take heed of the
Due Process concerns expressed in the ALI’s position.

118. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210.
119. Silberman, supra note 106 at 14–15. Where creditors anticipate an influx of debtors’ assets
into the forum state, courts should require a minimal evidentiary showing supporting such a belief while
permitting limited discovery to identify the property expected. Upon such a showing, there would seem
to be no unfairness in recognizing a foreign money judgment in a state otherwise alien to debtors.

